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Could Brexit Break the Tories? 
The Conservative Party in the UK is one of the most successful 
election-winning machines in history. It survived the effective 
destruction of the Whigs (the Liberal Party) and the concomitant rise 
of the Labour Party in the early 20th century. Indeed, it has spent most 
of the past century in power (making effective use of coalitions where 
expedient, in order to effectively neuter political opposition). 
Throughout its long history, however, it has faced numerous 
challenges and crises. Some have been existential – the split over the 
Corn Laws during the 1840s, for example. Other challenges have 
been broader but less severe, with the Attlee reforms of the 1940s 
leading to the emergence of so-called “one nation” Toryism. In this 
vein, it is noteworthy that Ireland has represented a consistent 
challenge to the Conservative Party over the past 150 years. Indeed, 
its full name – the Conservative and Unionist Party – indicates why 
this is the case. 
During the 1800s, the Tories consistently opposed home rule in 
Ireland, seeking to avoid any dilution to the Acts of Union of 1800. 
Ultimately, the Irish War of Independence scuppered this desire to 
retain ongoing an ongoing union with all of Ireland. During the 
20th century, and particularly since The Troubles, the relationship 
between the Conservative Party and Northern Ireland has been 
complex. 
As such, it is perhaps not surprising that it is once again the issue of 
Ireland that is now posing another existential threat to the 
Conservatives. The great irony is that Ireland itself is not central to the 
issue at stake: it is merely that the complex relationship between 
Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has so 
complicated the process of leaving the EU that resolution is elusive. 
Today, Brexit is the issue that threatens to break the Conservative 
Party asunder. Since the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty in the 
early 1990s, the Conservative Party has been split between 
Eurosceptics and those who are more pro-European. Opposition to 
Maastricht centred over the political centralisation that it heralded. It is 
therefore a deep irony that many of the issues that so motivated the 
Maastricht rebels have proven to be a thorn in the side of the EU not 
because of excessive centralisation but because member states have 
jealously guarded control over them. The absence of fiscal union in 
the Eurozone is perhaps the standout example, but many other areas 
are also stretching the bonds of EU nations (for example the absence 
of a common asylum policy during the 2015 migrant ‘crisis’ and 
Germany’s unilateral response to this). 
The Maastricht negotiations were a diplomatic triumph for the Major 
Government. The British gained opt-outs to a variety of areas that 
they objected to – including economic and monetary union – and the 
social chapter was removed from the body of the treaty. The British 
likewise obtained an opt-out from this. Nevertheless, these 
disagreements have festered within Tory ranks. 
With Maastricht as the trigger, the Conservative Party effectively 
cleaved in two over the issue. At the time, the bulk of the 
parliamentary party remained stoutly European, following Mrs 
Thatcher in supporting the creation of the Single Market. 
Nevertheless, the Eurosceptic rump were hugely effective in 
augmenting their influence with the active support of some within the 
print media. 
After 1997 the Tories became increasingly Eurosceptic, driven by two 
main factors. Firstly the parliamentary party was decimated by the 
crushing defeat inflicted by Tony Blair’s Labour Party in 1997. The 
rump that remained (if you’ll pardon the pun) was somewhat more 
Eurosceptic. This, combined with being dazzled by Blair’s youth and 
“star quality” alongside the rather cynical alliance between arch-
Europhile Kenneth Clarke and arch-Eurosceptic John Redwood 
(likened by some to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact!) led to the election 
of the Eurosceptic William Hague as leader. As a footnote, his 
disastrous 2001 election campaign centred on the “Save the Pound” 
slogan clearly backfired. Inconveniently, the pound is still with us 
almost 20 years later and doesn’t appear to be going anywhere. 
The second major factor driving Conservative Euroscepticism was the 
(somewhat esoteric) change to the party’s internal election rules in 
1998. As a result, the party membership (typically older, greyer and 
much more Eurosceptic than either the UK as a whole or the 
parliamentary party) hold a great deal of sway over leadership and 
thus the future direction of Tory Party policy. The end result is that the 
Tory Party today is considerably more Eurosceptic than in previous 
years. 
The events leading up to the EU Referendum have been widely 
covered and need not be rehashed here. Suffice it to say that a 
combination of the UKIP insurgency and a desire to appease the 
Eurosceptic wing of his party led David Cameron to promise a 
referendum he never expected to have to implement. In spite of all of 
these things, a majority of the parliamentary party supported 
remaining in the EU in 2016. 
A large minority, however, did not – particularly prominent examples 
include both longstanding Brexiters such as Redwood, but also more 
recent (and, dare I suggest, opportunistic) “converts” to the cause, 
most notably Boris Johnson. Ultimately the 2016 EU Referendum was 
unexpectedly won by the Leave campaign, triggering the course of 
events that have brought us to today. Far from uniting his party as 
hoped, in my opinion erroneously, by David Cameron, the 
Conservative Party remains more divided than ever on the question of 
Europe. 
The present situation poses an existential threat to the Conservatives. 
We have a Cabinet that has to be assiduously balanced between 
Leavers and Remainers, alongside a parliamentary party split into 
factions. Whilst the existing split has thus far been contained (with just 
3 MPs leaving for the newly formed ‘Independent Group’), there is a 
very clear risk it will become a yawning chasm that threatens to match 
the Grand Canyon in scope. 
The bulk of the parliamentary party have been coerced into voting for 
the Withdrawal Agreement. If this can somehow be passed, Theresa 
May stands a reasonable chance of keeping the Conservative Party 
whole, although there is a risk of losing certain individual MPs at the 
edges. The challenge in this event will come if the newly-formed 
Independent Group (potentially in conjunction with the near-defunct 
Liberal Democrats) emerge as a serious centrist (pro-European) 
challenge to ‘politics as usual’. Nevertheless, the powerful 
Conservative electoral machine will be difficult to defeat. 
The existential threat will come if Theresa May is unable to ram the 
Withdrawal Agreement through parliament. In this event, the UK will 
either need to ask the EU for a much longer extension to Article 50 
(potentially predicated on a second referendum, although a much 
softer Brexit vision in conjunction with the Labour Party is an unlikely 
second possibility) or leave without a Withdrawal Agreement in place. 
In either case, enough Conservative MPs will be outraged to 
effectively split the party. Whether the challenge is internal or external 
is, to a large extent, irrelevant. Ultimately, a steep electoral price will 
end up being paid. 
In spite of all of this, the Conservatives have developed an uncanny 
knack of arising phoenix-like out of the ashes of defeat. Only a fool 
would truly bet against them doing so again. Nevertheless, the winds 
of change are blowing once more and structures that we have hitherto 
taken for granted will not automatically avoid being swept away. 
 
